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Gift, Greeting, or Gesture: The Khatak and the
Negotiating of Its Meaning on the Anglo-Tibetan
Borderlands
Emma Martin

The uncertainties of the British Empire came
to the fore during cultural encounters. When
material things became a momentary focus
(especially those entangled in much larger
diplomatic events), how to negotiate them very
often resulted in a series of question marks
in the Foreign Department files. These micronarratives of empire, especially those played
out in the Himalayan borderlands of British
India reveal a less than omnipotent imperial
project.
Following the flight into exile of the thirteenth
Dalai Lama in February 1910, this paper will
trace out one tangible way in which the British
renegotiated their 300 years of accumulated
diplomatic ‘grammar.’ Using the arrival at state
level of the khatak (kha btags): a specifically
Himalayan piece of material culture, we will
witness the recoding of diplomatic protocols
made for ceremonials in the plains of India.
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Colonial archives make it possible to gain some
insight into how the British and their Persianderived diplomatic nomenclature attempted to
make sense and interpret these new material
encounters and exchanges taking place on the
edge of imperial influence and understanding.
As an exchange does of course require both a
giver and a receiver this paper will also weave
in khatak-related Tibetan sources, which make
it clear that this scarf already had multiple
meanings tied to it and that the Tibetans
renegotiated their own diplomatic “grammar”
while exiled from their power base in Lhasa.
Keywords: gift exchange, British India, Tibet, diplomatic
encounters, objects.

Introduction
On 22 February 1910, the Viceroy of India, Earl Minto
(served, 1905-1910) was watching events unfold in the
eastern Himalayan borderlands of British India with
a great deal of anxiety. According to Minto, what was

fully assessed. Indeed, the colonial anxieties of the Viceroy
make this seemingly Anglo-Tibetan encounter specifically
Himalayan. Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal—the Himalayan
states that had familial, religious, commercial, and political ties with Lhasa and who were now of course also
deeply entangled in British India’s colonial rule—would
be watching.5 How the British chose to make this ‘high
consideration’ visible had regional ramifications, which if
judged incorrectly could weaken only recently agreed Anglo-Himalayan treaties.6 If the British did not gauge their
treatment of the Dalai Lama and his status correctly, then
those Himalayan states newly drawn into British India
diplomatic ‘protection’ and alliances may well have turned
their attention to China instead.7 This paper will then take
us to a diplomatic landscape that the British were trying to
stop from unraveling at its Himalayan edges.
This was an encounter that took place in multiple borderlands, most obviously diplomatic and geographical
ones. Yet, just as palpable are the intellectual and cultural
borderlands: the outer limits of imperial knowledge and
understanding that separated Himalayan colonial encounters from those enacted on the Indian plains. For both the
Tibetans and the British, knowledge about places beyond
borders was nebulous and fragmentary. As a result, even

Figure 1. Elliot, Gilbert John Murray-Kynynmound, Viscount Melgund and
4th Earl of Minto. Photographed as Governor-General of Canada, 18861904. Courtesy of Library and Archives Canada, MIKAN no. 3426987.

happening there would have “not only on Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, but also on Indian opinion...a profound
effect.” He went on to say of this unprecedented event
that, “it is also necessary that we should show our border states that we are not afraid of China.”1 This closely
followed international incident was the flight into exile of
the thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tupten Gyatso (thub stan rgya
mtsho) (1868-1933). He had arrived in Gnatong, Sikkim just
the day before having fled Lhasa as 2,000 Chinese troops
advanced on Tibet’s capital, led by the soon-to-be new Chinese amban (resident), Zhong Ying.2 As his escape routes
had narrowed down, he and his entourage were left with
little choice but to head for the safety of British India and a
government whose diplomatic advances he had until then
resolutely ignored.3
The Viceroy’s orders that, “it is of first importance to show
him [the Dalai Lama] high consideration. He is regarded
with veneration and awe in India,”4 showed he was well
aware that how the British treated the lama would be care-

Figure 2. Tupten Gyatso, the thirteenth Dalai Lama photographed at
Hastings House, Calcutta on 16 March 1910. Photographer: Johnston &
Hoffman. Courtesy of National Museums Liverpool, 1967.183.2.
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the smallest gesture offers us the opportunity to witness
the process of statemaking. As a consequence it is possible
to trace the strata of colonial knowledge, including how
opinions and attitudes differed between those stationed in
the Himalaya and those stationed at Foreign Department
desks in British India’s imperial cities. Through the discussions and often conflicting opinions of colonial officers –
individuals who inhabited very different colonial worlds –
we see the minutiae of statemaking. Clear tensions emerge
within government memos in establishing just how high
this consideration for the Dalai Lama would actually be.
Would he be understood as the head of a Himalayan state,
a religious figurehead or something else? While those
officers who operated in Himalayan networks pressed for
the highest diplomatic honors their persuasive arguments
came under considerable pressure from other officers who
understood very little about the politics of state in the
Himalaya.
The question of greatest concern in this article is not
simply tied to the uncertainties of state making, but more
pointedly to how this ‘high consideration’ materialized.
Anglo-Himalayan diplomacy has increasingly become a
topic of conversation for scholars interested in the modern
geo-politics of Tibet and its neighbors.8 Yet, much less has
been said about a crucial component of these diplomatic
meetings: the objects that punctuated these events and
especially those exchanged between heads of state and
recognized rulers (see Martin 2014 and 2015 as exceptions
to this scholarly trend). While the gifts that accompanied
these diplomatic meetings are occasionally and cursorily
mentioned in political narratives, they have much to tell
us about how each party imagined and positioned the other in relation to their own imagined status.
Such objects also represent what I call ‘material knowledge,’ a facet of colonial knowledge that has received
little consideration despite the intense focus on imperial
forms of knowledge making in recent years.9 To give this
concept a definition we should think about it as a type of
knowledge that could be constructed about others from
material things. This is not simply knowledge accrued by
looking alone, but from touching, performing, valuing, and
displaying material things, which could lead to the seeking
out and eventual incorporating of local (in this case Himalayan) connoisseurial scholarship into colonial archives.
Material knowledge, like many other forms of knowledge
borne of cultural contact, had a ‘fuzzy logic’ as it, “never
follows a preconceived script but is always unpredictable
and messy” (Mackenthun and Juterczenka 2009: 10). It was
often informed by prior ‘culture contact’ (Campbell 2003),
wherein ways of doing things in one culture is reconfig-
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ured and made anew for another in order to control and
make safe volatile and unforeseen encounters. While
gift-giving was often viewed as a diplomatic nuisance by
Secretaries of State and Foreign Department officials, the
objects presented on these occasions were critical to the
political process. They were regularly mined for information, with knowledge made from and projected onto things
as they circulated between parties. As Patricia Berger notes
in her nuanced reading of the Qing emperor Qianlong’s gift
exchanges, gifts, and material things per se were, “multivocal in the messages they sent, presenting a long menu
of possible positive [EM: and I would also add negative or
anxious] readings” (Berger 2003: 41).
To this end, I argue that by following things – in this case
white scarves – and the gestures tied to them, we have
the opportunity to read beyond the more obvious political
narratives found in the colonial archive. By focusing on the
choices made following the arrival at state level of a particularly Tibetan piece of material culture, the khatak (kha
btags) or white ceremonial scarf, it is possible to conceive
of a more balanced understanding of the shifting power
dynamics at play, especially when the sites of encounter
move between British India and Tibet. By highlighting the
gestures, terminology, and hierarchies stitched into the
khatak by the British India government and the Dalai Lama,
we see that both parties played with its meaning. Paraphrasing Lorraine Daston, the khatak could indeed ‘talk’
(Daston 2004), but both the British and the Tibetans had on
occasion selective listening, which becomes apparent as
we attune ourselves to the registers they chose to hear and
those they chose to brush under the ceremonial carpet.
As the title of this article suggests, I read these encounters
against the political grain, instead watching over the first
meetings between the Viceroy of India and his Tibetan
counterpart, the Dalai Lama, using a sharply focused
material lens. What will become clear is that these diplomatic encounters and their negotiating—played out more
than a century ago—are still strikingly pertinent today.
The “grammar” (Michael 2003: 83) hurriedly constructed
for this unforeseen event would in fact establish a set of
ground rules for future global powers and their interactions with Tibet that are still evident today.
The Khatak and its Transcultural Meanings
As the British watched nervously from their administrative
positions the first khatak in this burgeoning Anglo-Tibetan
relationship arrived three weeks before the Dalai Lama, on
3 February, 1910 in Calcutta. This khatak was accompanied
by an urgent verbal message sent by the Dalai Lama to
Viceroy Minto, regarding the escalating situation in Lhasa.

Yet, the khatak, meant to be read as an authenticator of the
message with which it traveled, was seemingly unintelligible to Spencer Harcourt Butler (1869-1938), the Foreign
Department Secretary of State for British India, who was
thoroughly bemused by this scarf. Having received the
khatak from the Dalai Lama’s messengers he wrote in dispatches, “I asked if they had any letter from the Dalai Lama
to the Viceroy. They said they had not, that the scarf was
sufficient according to their custom.”10 This was clearly
outside the cultural comfort zone of a Secretary of State
who oversaw a department whose note-taking was later
described as an “intellectual tours de force” (Dewey 1993:
6). With a hint of desperation Butler asked, “Please look up
papers and see what was done in previous communications
between the Dalai Lama or Tashi [Panchen] Lama and Viceroy. [sic] and note anything that we have about Tibetan
etiquette.”11
Butler seems to have had a rather severe case of imperial
amnesia when it came to the khatak, for it had already
played a significant part in making material contact between the British in India and Tibet. Its origins can in fact
be traced out to The East India Company’s first contact
with Tibet in 1774. This was the year that Warren Hastings
(1732-1818), then Governor-General of Bengal received
a letter and gifts from the sixth Panchen Lama, Lozang
Pelden Yéshé (blo bzang dpal ldan ye shes) (1738-80) asking
for assistance with the Bhutan-Cooch Behar conflict. When
Puhrangir and Paima, two Himalayan gosain12 (a mendicant
Hindu) and agents of the Panchen Lama, delivered the

request for assistance in Calcutta Hastings made sure not
to simply take note of what was written in the lama’s letter, but to also make a close reading of the gifts. As Bishop
shows, they did indeed speak to him:
Gilded Russian leather stamped with the Czar’s
double-headed eagle, and Chinese silk, which suggested external commerce; small ingots of gold and
silver, purses of gold dust, and bags of musk, which
seemed evidence of internal wealth; and Tibetan
wool cloth, which together with the well-made
chests in which the gifts had come, indicated a
knowledge of arts and industries (Bishop 1989: 29)
In his seminal work The Myth of Shangri-La, Bishop understood the latent potential in things and that they contributed to complex processes of knowledge gathering, which
in this case showed itself in pre-colonial Anglo-Himalayan
relations. As Hastings ran his fingers over the luxury
commodities in the traveling chests, Bishop concluded that
the gifts “activated ancient rumors and vague fragments of
knowledge that had been steadily accumulating over the
centuries” (Bishop Ibid). These objects of desire not only
alerted Hastings to potentially lucrative trans-Himalayan
trading relations, but they also indicated to him that the
Panchen Lama was a potential regional leader who could
make his commercial ambitions in the Himalaya a reality.
George Bogle (1746-81), the twenty-seven-year-old private
secretary to Hastings was chosen as the Governor’s ambassador. He visited Bhutan before making his way to Tashi
Figure 3. ‘The Teshu Lama (d 1780)
Giving Audience’, attributed to Tilly
Kettle, c.1775. Likely commissioned
by Warren Hastings and gifted
to King George III. RCIN 407227.
Courtesy of Royal Collections ©
HM Queen Elizabeth II 2014.
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Lhunpo monastery near Shigatse to meet the Panchen
Lama. This mission was later immortalized in a fabulous,
if somewhat flawed painting now in The Royal Collection,
seemingly commissioned by Hastings from one of the artists he favored in India, Tilly Kettle (1735-86). The moment
chosen to represent this new relationship was Bogle and
the Panchen Lama’s first moment of material contact—the
exchange of the khatak.
Before glancing over the meanings worked into this painting we should first briefly pause on the khatak itself. There
are a number of contemporary Tibetan writings on the
khatak that provide a cultural framework for understanding this piece of Tibetan material.13 Two publications in
particular discuss the khatak in its historical and contemporary context and make reference to the loss of the nuanced meanings that were once ascribed to it, particularly
in pre-1959 Ü or central Tibet (dbus). The first, a eulogy to
the khatak was originally published in 1989 and again as a
letter sent to the author in 2013 from Rakra Rinpoche (rag
ra rin po che) (1925-2012), the Tibetan scholar, artist, and
poet who had studied with Gendün Chöpel (dge ’dan chos
’phel). He not only praised the scarf’s many qualities, but
he also lamented its now ubiquitous and uncritical use
in the late twentieth century (rdo rje dbang phyug 2013:
339-41). The second, a 1997 publication from the Library
of Tibetan Works and Archives on the customs and rituals
relating to the khatak was compiled by Lobsang Dönden for
the Library’s oral history series based on interviews with
Tibetans who had served as lay officials in pre-1959 Tibet
(Blo bzang don ldan 1997).14

In simple terms the khatak is a white scarf. Its use, believed to originate in Mongolia, now stretches across many
Himalayan communities who have strong ties with Tibet
and its culture. These cultural synergies make the scarf a
common sight not only in Tibet, but also in Ladakh, Nepal,
Bhutan, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh
and at Buddhist sites in plains India. Lobsang Dönden, in
his preliminary description, notes that the khatak “forms
an indispensable practice that binds two sides into a
cordial relationship in all important secular and religious
events, festivals, and ceremonies” (Blo bzang don ldan
1997: 11).15 This is an idea we will return to. Furthermore,
the khatak can also be found in a diverse range of offering
contexts, from being given to lamas and guests on arrival
and departure, to serving as letter wraps or, as we have
already seen, as message authenticators. The khatak is
also offered at significant religious and pilgrimage sites,
at river confluences, the summit of high passes, and even
as a catapult, used to throw gifts of money to performers.
Rakra Rinpoche also alerts us to the potential Tibetan material hierarchies of the khatak and the fact that the fabric,
weave, and length of the khatak constituted a complex
matrix of material knowledge. “As regarding the types of
Khatak, there are three: nangzö (nang mdzod), ashi (a she),
possibly a Mongolian term, and zubshi (zub shi). Nangzö
were reserved for important occasions, appointment of
Kalons, and enthronement of high Lamas; ashi was used
in common festivities, and zubshi is given to those of the
lower class” (rdo rje dbang phyug 2013: 341).16 Starting in
reverse order, the zubshi, is an open weave, mesh-like scarf
used for less important occasions and ordinary events, but
Figure 4. zub-shi khatak – a
simple open weave khatak that is
extremely rare today.
(Emma Martin, 2015)
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Figure 5. a-shi khatak – a silk
khatak with a single layer of
tassels.
(Emma Martin, 2015)

Figure 6. nang-dzö khatak – a long
wide silk khatak with a double
layer of tassels.
(Emma Martin, 2015)

also when working people give offerings representing the
three-fold mandala of body, speech, and mind. The silk ashi
is used on important occasions, its defining feature being
a single layer of tassels. This is the scarf most commonly
used today. Finally, the premium scarf, the nangdzö, is woven in a similar way to the ashi, but is often much longer in
length and with a woven piece within the tassels to create
two ‘layers’ (Blo bzang don ldan 1997). While this was a
scarf specifically used during festivals, the nangdzö would
also become enmeshed in the diplomatic relations between
Tibet and British India.

If we take a closer look at Kettle’s painting with these
khatak meanings in mind, the material hierarchy of this
gesture is missing – we cannot see the single or double layer of tassels here. But there were other British markers of
hierarchy on show. We see Bogle—dressed in a Bhutanese
robe that is then draped with a status enhancing Roman
toga-like cloth—standing at the far left of the painting,
while a man dressed in Tibetanesque clothing steps forward to offer the khatak. The Panchen Lama, wearing a
fur-lined riding hat, sits reaching out with just one hand to
take the offered scarf. The actions, the etiquette, and the
HIMALAYA Volume 35, Number 2 | 61

materiality of the scene is “muddled” (Teltscher 2006: 176).
The painting seems to be an amalgam of several meetings
between the two men that only in part matches the account of their first meeting on 8 November 1774.
The Lama was upon his throne, formed of wood,
carved and gilt, with some cushions above it, upon
which he sat cross-legged...I laid the Governor’s
presents before him, delivering the letter and pearl
necklace into his own hands, together with a white
Pelong handkerchief on my own part, according to
the custom of the country...The Lama...threw white
Pelong handkerchiefs over our necks at retiring.
(Bogle in Markham 1876: 83)
This ‘muddling’ is something that Kate Teltscher in her
evocative account of Bogle’s expedition to Tibet presumes
is a result of the reconstruction of this scene in the artist’s
studio, seemingly staged by Bogle himself after his return
to Calcutta. She wonders if Bogle had reimagined this
moment as, “perhaps the stooping posture of presentation
was considered inappropriate for Bogle...The upright Bogle
retains his dignity” (Teltscher 2006: Ibid). Yet, there is also
the possibility of reading this gesture as one that despite
the perceived correcting of prestige by Kettle and Bogle,
still manages to muddle what it means to offer and receive
a khatak.
In her own reading of this painting, Teltscher makes us
acutely aware of the significance of the performative
act; the gestures and specific events that the khatak was
incorporated into. In this painting we are guided by its
British agents (its sitter, painter, and patron) to read a
series of hierarchical encodings that seemingly enhance
British prestige and power, but this is all rather lop-sided.
If we look again, factoring in Tibetan understandings of
the theatricalities at play whilst using the khatak-related
writings of Rakra Rinpoche and the compilations made by
Lobsang Dönden as reference points, it is possible to sketch
in unintended (from Bogle’s perspective) Tibetan layers of
meaning.
Rakra Rinpoche was acutely aware that both temporal and
cultural distances had led to a repurposing of the khatak in
the late 20th and early 21st century. He lamented the fact
that the Tibet-specific hierarchical gestures of offering
the khatak had become highly volatile as the khatak and
its meanings and gestures became mobile as it moved into
exile. As a result the practice of placing the scarf around
the receiver’s neck had become common practice. “These
days it has however become fashion to tie Khataks around
people’s neck and hence we see brides and grooms almost
asphyxiated by the loads of Khataks that weigh around
their neck, which is ridiculous” (rdo rje dbang phyug 2013:
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Ibid).17 The fluctuating meaning of the scarf when performed in different geographical contexts, was something
that the British officers stationed in the Himalaya also
recognized. Charles Bell (1870-1945), the Political Officer
in Sikkim, who we will meet again shortly, would make a
point of noting the cultural subtleties between the Indian
and Tibetan practice of garlanding in his second volume on
Tibetan culture, The People of Tibet published in 1928.
Among the peoples of India it is an exceptional
honour to receive a garland round the neck, but the
same rule does not apply to the ka-ta of Tibet. And
thus the foreigner from India has sometimes been
misled, not understanding that, when a ka-ta was
placed round his neck, he was being marked with a
status of inferiority (Bell 1928: 250).
Rakra Rinpoche having emphasized this smoothing out
of Tibetan customs in exile then looked to replace its
contours using his own knowledge of khatak practice in
pre-1959 Tibet.
The etiquette for offering requires a person to
present Khataks in the hands of parents and Lamas
if they’re standing or to place them on the table if
they are seated. Younger siblings placed Khataks
in the hands of the older siblings, and parents did
the same to their sons. As a sign of respect, friends
exchanged Khataks by handing them instead of
tying them around each other’s neck (rdo rje dbang
phyug 2013: Ibid).18
We see this practice quite clearly in Bogle’s written account of his first meeting with the Panchen Lama. Bogle,
in receiving the khatak around his neck, is undoubtedly the
subordinate during their meeting. However, if we return
to Kettle’s painting—the visual and public colonial record
of this meeting—we see that the performance has changed.
Here, an intermediary offers the khatak, yet still this British
correction is by no means perfect. If we turn to the compendium provided by Lobsang Dönden that again references pre-1959 practice and especially if we scan the Lhasa
New Year ceremonies for officials, these oral testimonies
offer a strict ordering of khatak presentation. It is clear
that civil officials and foreign diplomats neither placed
their khatak on the Dalai Lama’s table nor into his casually
offered hands. This moment of material contact was, as
in Kettle’s painting, completed by an intermediary, as no
civil official had the privilege or the right to approach him
directly with a khatak.
Clearly, Tilly Kettle’s painting is an imperfect act of
remembrance and artistic translation. But nevertheless,
as Natasha Eaton (2013) notes, the representation of

cross-cultural encounters was a popular and powerful
device in the emerging empires of the eighteenth century, marking those represented—in this case Bogle, but
by extension Hastings – as agents in the embryonic act of
empire building. The khatak, in this British context, already
signaled the beginning of a ruler-to-ruler relationship.
In the depiction of its offering, it visualized those whom
the British had chosen to be their would-be Himalayan
counterparts. Despite the temporal distance between Lobsang Dönden and Rakra Rinpoche’s understanding of the
khatak and this painting, in retrospect it is possible to think
through this scene with Tibetan khatak etiquette in mind.
We do not necessarily see a dignified, aloof ambassador
of a soon to be imperial power, but instead see a portrayal of another powerful ruler: the Panchen Lama. Despite
positioning Bogle at the edges of this painting, Kettle still
shows the British to be subordinate in this moment of contact. In her reading of this painting and the likely processes of its creation Teltscher concludes that, “the painting
commemorates a moment of cultural accommodation”
(Teltscher 2006: 176). Yet as we leave this painting behind
and return to 1910, it is obvious that rather than benignly
smoothing over tensions during cultural encounters, material things were just as likely to make cultural fault lines
acutely visible.
Making Hierarchies: Gun Shots and Silk Scarves
Kettle’s conversation piece, painted some 135 years before
the event we are concerned with here, aimed to suggest
that the British knew and could thereby control such
diplomatic meetings and their associated material culture.
Nevertheless, if we return to the reception given to the
khatak by the bemused Butler in February 1910, we see it
was actually causing a great deal of concern. After Butler’s cries to “note anything that we have about Tibetan
etiquette,” reverberated down the corridors of the Foreign
Department, Butler then composed himself, deciding that
this ethereal message wrapped in a scarf gave the British
India government a little breathing space. The Tibetan
officials may have delivered a khatak from the Dalai Lama,
but the British refused to recognize it as an official channel
of communication, leaving this diplomatic agent and its
two intermediaries without an audience with the Viceroy.
Butler further cemented his intentions by adding that, “we
should not enter into any written communication with the
Dalai Lama about the relations between the Tibetans and
Chinese until he first addresses us in writing.”19 However,
these deferring tactics would no longer work once the
Dalai Lama arrived in British India. On 24 February, the day
the Dalai Lama reached Pedong in Sikkim, Butler reminded
the Foreign Department staff in a somewhat prophetically

worded statement that, “we are face to face now with a
real North-Eastern Frontier question and the moment has
come to formulate a policy. His Majesty’s Secretary of State
will probably move now that the matter is hot. If we cannot settle things now we are not likely to be able to settle
them hereafter.”20
While the British tracked the Dalai Lama’s escape from
Lhasa, the Foreign Department had already begun to make
preparations for his arrival. The officials must have been
circumspect, as just a few short years before the British
Indian government had targeted the ninth Panchen Lama,
Tupten Chökyi Nyima (thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma) (18831937) as a potential leader in Tibet, someone they could
conduct trade and diplomatic relations with.21 With this
new arrival and the potential for new diplomatic encounters, the Dalai Lama and his reception had to be carefully
arranged. There was though a clear difference of opinion
between colonial officers as to how this moment should be
articulated. On 22 February, the day after the Dalai Lama
set foot on British Indian soil, Butler sent word to, “instruct the local authorities to show His Holiness every personal courtesy” but tellingly, “the visit should be regarded
as private.”22 This labeling gave an early indication of how
British India would establish a road map for the types of
actions and gestures that were to follow. It is at this stage
that we begin to see how the British manufactured their
contact with the Dalai Lama and how the process of showing British civility, whilst keeping him politically at arm’s
length manifested itself. Despite the categorizing of the
Dalai Lama’s visit as private, there were clearly many official features here, which could have been easily misread by
the Tibetan delegation, especially since they would have
no knowledge of this British classification. The most obvious example was that the Dalai Lama and his eighty-strong
entourage were to be hosted at Hastings House in Calcutta.
Hastings House, a grand residence of the British Indian
government, was used by the Viceroy to entertain foreign
heads of states and India’s Princely State rulers. In the days
prior to the Dalai Lama’s arrival preparations were made
and discussions were had relating to the etiquette that
would imbue this so-called private visit. Along with the
purchase of saffron bed linen for the Dalai Lama’s quarters,23 questions were raised over the tangible and intangible markers of state business that despite its ‘private’
labeling would welcome the lama to Calcutta.
In order to put the discussions regarding the khatak into
some kind of wider ceremonial context, it is useful at
this juncture to take note of the most audible of these
ceremonial markers—a military gun salute.24 The British
India gun salute was a highly structured instrument
HIMALAYA Volume 35, Number 2 | 63

Figure 7. The Tibetan exiles in
Hastings House, Calcutta, March
1910. Photographer: Th.Parr /
Burlington Smith. Courtesy of
Private Collection.

Figure 8. Postcard of Hastings
House. Early 20th century.
Photographer: Johnston &
Hoffman. Collection of Emma
Martin.

of hierarchy, which, along with titles and decorations,
articulated a ranking, imposed by the British, on the
Indian Princely State rulers and foreign dignitaries (see
Cannadine 2001). The gun salute made audible just how
significant the British considered any given ruler to be,
with salutes ranging from the lowest at eleven to the
highest at twenty-one. The question for the British was,
just how many gun salutes should the Dalai Lama receive?
The files that Butler had called for, but which offered very
little in the way of determining what he should do with
the recently arrived khatak did give up details of precedent
64 | HIMALAYA Fall 2015

when it came to the question of gun salutes. The Panchen
Lama during his visit to the Viceroy in 1906, Butler noted,
had received seventeen salutes as he entered Hastings
House. Then, the British understood the Panchen Lama’s
powers as a ruler to equate to those of other ‘third tier’
Princely State rulers, including Bikaner, Cochin (now
Kochi, Kerala), and Jaipur (Coen 1971: 262). While the
Panchen Lama’s status was deemed lower than powerful
states such as Baroda, Gwalior, and Jammu-Kashmir, his
place in the hierarchy of Himalayan heads of state was
unrivalled. Bhutan and Sikkim would be his nearest chal-

lengers when awarded fifteen salutes respectively in 1911
at the Delhi Durbar (Martin 2012: 10), while Cooch-Behar
would be invested with a more modest thirteen salutes.
However, for a new group of Himalayan officers who had
not been directly connected with the promotion of the
Panchen Lama as the British India government’s preferred
Tibetan figurehead, this was not going to be enough for the
arrival of the Dalai Lama.
Charles Bell, the Political Officer for Sikkim, Bhutan, and
Tibet would become well known for the relationship he
would cultivate with the Dalai Lama in 1910 along with the
many books—including a biography of the Dalai Lama—he
would write on Tibetan culture. Bell was himself a cultural
intermediary of sorts: a British officer firmly rooted in a
colonial ideology, but whose ways of thinking were sliced
through with Himalayan and Tibetan ways of conceptualizing the world. Bell would describe himself on his return
from Lhasa in 1921 as, “in large measure Tibetanised,” (Bell
[1946 1987: 29) and while this statement might be stretching his depth of understanding somewhat, his experiences
and knowledge did make Bell Britain’s ‘Man on the Spot.’
It is Bell’s starting position on the subject of gun salutes
for the Dalai Lama that opens up the differences—what
I called earlier the strata—visible in colonial knowledge.
We see here that colonial worldviews rub up against each
other, especially when conversations occurred between
desk-bound officers in the metropoles of empire and those
based in the borderlands. Butler having noted this Panchen
Lama precedent suggested the idea of seventeen-gun-salutes to Bell, but Bell had other ideas. Bell wanted twentyone-gun salutes—the highest salute—for the Dalai Lama.
Bell couched his counter-argument in terms of the lama’s
superior status as a religious authority. For Bell, he was
someone who was, “worshipped as a deity by 10 or 12
million Buddhists and is venerated by at least a hundred
million more.”25 Bell, portrayed the Dalai Lama not simply
as a leader of a nation state, a position which might make
the Foreign Department more than a little nervous, but as
someone who had influence and power that could not be
contained by national borders. But Butler’s predisposition
for maintaining colonial order, which manifested itself in
the colonial fuzzy logic known as precedent, was not so
easily swayed by Bell’s religious rethinking of the Dalai
Lama’s powerbase. Interestingly, Butler chose to factor in
a further, new, but still today enduring perception of the
Dalai Lama that would temper any powers that Bell might
plead for. “Mr Bell thinks that His Holiness should get 21
guns...The Tashi [Panchen] Lama got 17 guns. As he was
our friend and the Dalai Lama was not and is a refugee I
think 19 guns is enough” (author emphasis).26

Bell’s was a decidedly Himalayan view. By 1910 he had
spent a decade working in the Himalayan borderlands and
was someone who understood religious power to be as, if
not more, potent than any possible British India decoration or title could be. However, Butler from his Foreign
Department desk was not willing to be swayed entirely by
Himalayan sensibilities and instead of viewing the Dalai
Lama as someone whose religious authority made him an
unequalled power, Butler would read the lama as a refugee, someone who had lost something of his potency the
moment he stepped on British Indian soil. Furthermore,
while the British with one eye on the Himalayan reading
of their treatment of the Dalai Lama wanted to express a
heightened sense of civility, the lama had sought asylum
here—he had not been invited to India. This unanticipated
arrival may have given men like Bell unforeseen opportunities to forge links with a man who had refused to deal
with the British prior to his arrival. However, for Butler
the lama’s appearance would cause the British a constant
diplomatic headache and this had to be factored into the
honors shown him. This wider perspective meant that
Butler would not countenance twenty-one-gun salutes for
the Dalai Lama, but there was a meeting in the middle: the
lama would receive nineteen.
This bartering for state honors would continue when
Butler again turned to Bell, this time on the subject of the
khatak. On 12 March, two days before the meeting with
the Viceroy at Hastings House, Butler realized that he had
yet to settle the issue of what to do with the khatak and so
again Bell was sought out for advice. Bell instructed Butler
that, “the Viceroy/Foreign Secretary should rise and present a scarf to the Dalai Lama, who will rise to receive it.”27
If we think back to the misplaced choreography sketched
into the khatak exchange between Bogle and the Panchen
Lama and the pre-1959 Tibetan readings of the scarf as
recorded by Rakra Rinpoche and Lobsang Dönden, the
gesture suggested by Bell would be read by the Dalai Lama
and other Tibetan witnesses as an acceptable exchange.
Perhaps due to gaps in colonial knowledge, this approach
seemed at first to be agreeable to those in the Foreign
Department and the Viceroy’s inner circle. However, a
demi-official letter of the same day reveals that Butler was
about to be swayed by the fuzzy logic of men who had no
connection whatsoever to the Himalaya. In their discussions we see the potential for a triple translation and colonial recoding of the khatak and it becomes clear that those
in Calcutta found it impossible to think in a ‘Tibetanised’
way and instead sought their answers from the courtly
Persian terminology of the Princely States of plains India.
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Soon after his conversation with Bell, Butler consulted
his Under Secretary Arthur Roylance Jelf (1875- d. before
1941), who had in turn been discussing the khatak exchange with Alexander Fleetwood Pinhey (1861-1916), the
Viceroy’s Private Secretary. While Jelf and Pinhey were
career colonial administrators who had spent several years
respectively in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier,
they had little knowledge of the Himalayan world. Yet, the
small matter of lived experience would not stop Jelf, using
Pinhey’s musings, from advising Butler on what should be
done with the fast approaching khatak exchange.
The full Tibetan custom would be for the Dalai
Lama to present a scarf to the Viceroy on arriving
at Government House and receiving a scarf from
the Viceroy on leaving; and vice versa at Hastings
House. But in the case of the Tashi [Panchen] Lama
the Viceroy gave no scarf. Mr. Bell thinks a scarf
should be given at the return visit. It should be
given by Foreign Secretary to mark the rank of the
Viceroy. They did not make much of the Dalai Lama
at Peking and in such matters we should be careful
of going too far.’28
In the space of just a few hours the Dalai Lama’s status—
performed using British India khatak choreography—had
gone from one of high prestige, where material contact
would be made between equals, to the complete dismissal of the lama. Jelf was here suggesting that the Viceroy
should not engage with the Dalai Lama at all. The Viceroy
would not offer a khatak during their initial meeting and
the equally crucial return visit would not be made by the
Viceroy, but by his subordinate, Foreign Secretary Butler.
Here, we are privy to the proposed transformation of the
khatak into a British tool of hierarchical designation, enabling rank and standing to be tacitly communicated to the
Tibetans, just in case the significance of the nineteen-gun
salute as opposed to the Viceroy’s forty-one gun salute
was not enough. This common, but nevertheless complex
offering was about to be unraveled with new British India
meanings woven into it, making a nuanced reading by
the Dalai Lama a messy and confusing undertaking. There
were clear hierarchical implications in this reworking; if
this was not the case then there would be no obvious need
to alter the established practice as suggested by Bell. The
British in their actions were then hoping to make visible
their hesitations over how they would quantify their future relationship with the Lhasa government.
We might consider these British India government affronts to be expected, but what is rather interesting here
is that Jelf and Pinhey were not building this ceremonial
picture simply by positioning the Dalai Lama vis à vis the
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Viceroy. This new diplomatic construction had in fact been
determined by what they understood the khatak to be. It
appears that something had simply been lost in translation
when both men carried out their colonial classification of
the khatak. In establishing what the khatak was they had
relied on a fixed inventory of equivalent Persian terms; a
practice commonly applied to ceremonial etiquette and
its construction by British Residents based in the Princely
States. In doing so they had quantified the khatak as a naẕr,
the Persian term for a tribute or gift of money, in short
a tangible, financial thing. In Jelf and Pinhey’s Persian
reading of this encounter it would be impossible for the
Viceroy to step forward and present the Dalai Lama with a
naẕr. This would be understood by the British as a subordinate act and one that would surely damage the Viceroy’s
prestige, especially, as Jelf and Pinhey suggested in their
deliberations, in the eyes of China.29 While Jelf and Pinhey
did not implicitly refer to a Himalayan presence, they were
also well aware that Himalayan states would watch over
this event intently; Sidkeong Tulku (1879-1914) was part
of the Dalai Lama’s extended entourage, attending as the
British India approved heir to the Sikkim gadi (throne).30 In
this context, neither man believed there could possibly be
an exchange of khatak as proposed.
But Bell was not about to allow imperial ignorance jeopardize any chance he had of building closer diplomatic
relations with Tibet. Having seen the hurriedly dispatched
memo on this conversation he was quick to step in firing
back a note that made it clear that this exchange was, “an
act of common courtesy which can hardly be omitted and
in no way resembles a nazar.”31 Using his Himalayan perspective he was clearly alarmed that both the Dalai Lama
and Sidkeong Tulku would interpret this as an arrogant
and dismissive act and therefore he asked for the khatak
and its colonial classification to be realigned. The Foreign
Department as a result would reclassify the offering of the
khatak with yet another Persian term, this time mizaaj pursi
(the wishing of health ceremony), and would in subsequent memos and reports refer to the exchange of scarves
as such.
This movement of the meaning rather than the gesture
itself would allow a compromised khatak exchange to take
place.32 The British had instantly read the khatak as a material thing, hence their assumption that the khatak should
be classified as a naẕr. Jelf and Pinhey found it difficult to
think of the scarf as a sign of something else: a sentiment,
an offering of sincerity, something that acts as a precursor to the exchanges both vocal and material that were
to follow. Butler had already grasped these dynamics and
used them to his own advantage. They instead had chosen

to read it solely through its material value—as a tangible
thing—a gift, loaded with issues of reciprocity. The classifying of the khatak as mizaaj pursi suited the British: not
only did it sidestep any issues of reciprocity, but the term
and its associated meanings were not seen to be binding,
unlike the giving of a naẕr, which implied a material binding together of the actors involved. The mizaaj pursi was
regarded as a simple salutation, a lesser, non-binding offering.33 The British had from their perspective successfully
repurposed the khatak to their own advantage.
But, what of the Tibetans? The colonial archive as we
might expect does not provide both sides of this exchange
story.34 Furthermore, I have been frustrated by the lack of
detail recorded in the biography of the thirteenth Dalai
Lama, which offers a poor record of his visit to Calcutta.35
Despite this, the inclusion of the wording in the fleeting
Tibetan account of a week in Calcutta may suggest that
the lama knew or had been instructed by the British as to
what his newly conceived status and the offering of the
khatak would now mean. The biography records that, “he
traveled to the place, currently known to the people as Calcutta, where he met and exchanged greetings with Mulula
[Minto], the British Regent.”36 It is tempting to grasp on to
this speck of Tibetan insight, but it is also rather difficult
from this to analyze the complexity of gestures and their
meanings with any certainty. Therefore, by returning to
the material in the archival record and by following the
khatak back to Tibet it is clear that the Tibetans had been
acutely aware of their exile status and that they had in fact
reworked their own nuanced khatak culture in order to
flatter and gain favor from the British.
The Khatak Back in Tibet
The British had grown use to receiving the highest khatak
honors from the Tibetans, while on British Indian soil.
David Macdonald (1870-1962), the Scottish-Sikkim British Trade Agent stationed at Yatung in Dromo (dro mo) or
Chumbi Valley, received the Dalai Lama as he went on the
run from Lhasa in February 1910 (Macdonald (1932) 2005:
65). Macdonald having requested asylum for the lama was
allowed to offer him overnight assistance and as the Dalai
Lama entered the Trade Agency, Macdonald recalled much
later that, “he offered me a very large silk scarf, called
nagdzo, and shook my hand” (Macdonald (1932) 2005: 65).
The additional gesture—the handshake—tells us that the
Dalai Lama was already renegotiating the tightly choreographed meanings of the khatak and reworking them for
these unexpected and fraught encounters with British officers. There is no wonder that Macdonald vividly recalled
this material encounter in his memoirs as the giving of a

nangdzö khatak—meant for the highest echelons of Tibetan
society—by a religious leader into the hands of a junior lay
official would have been unprecedented.37 Desperate times
called for desperate measures and the Dalai Lama—unlike
the British—was not willing to take the risk that he might
offend Macdonald (and by extension the British) by not
personally giving a scarf.
This first piece of khatak contact would define the Dalai
Lama’s ceremonial practices in exile. He would apply this
same exaggerated, flattering gesture many times in British
India and with many relatively junior officers, amongst
others Charles Bell, who of his first meeting with the lama
in Darjeeling recalled:
Over my wrist he placed a gorgeous white silk
scarf, and I one over his, the best I had been able to
procure. For this is the recognized Tibetan form of
greeting, and by placing the scarf, as he did, over
my wrists, instead of round my neck, the Incarnation of Buddha disclaimed all superiority of rank
(Bell 1987 [1946]: 104).38
The Dalai Lama, new to British India and its hierarchies,
circumspectly negotiated his own actions and expectations
accordingly. He knew, like the British did, that he was now
in a vulnerable position and therefore must temper his
actions. His gestures and his decisions as to which khatak
to offer were those of a man who had left his homeland
with nothing and now needed the support of an influential
empire, and if this involved a certain amount of flattery to
those men who could help him garner support, then these
were the steps he would take. It would be another ten
years before the British would come to the realization that
the Dalai Lama had also recoded the khatak whilst in unfamiliar territory from 1910 to 1912. Bell, having come out of
retirement to head a mission to Lhasa in 1920 to 1921, and
as the first European to receive a personal invitation from
the Dalai Lama, may have expected that he would be treated to similar khatak honors as to those he had received in
Darjeeling and Calcutta. However, now firmly established
as temporal ruler of central Tibet,39 things were very different when the British came to call on the Dalai Lama.
Bell would witness one of the most spectacular khatak
related ceremonials in the Tibetan calendar when he was
invited to the Gyelpo Losar or King’s New Year (rgyal po lo
gsar) in 1921. The first two days of losar (New Year) allowed
the lay officials of Lhasa, central Tibet, and the foreign
dignitaries residing in Lhasa to receive their audience with
the Dalai Lama, with their moment of diplomatic contact
punctuated by the offering of a khatak. Bell watched out
for the hierarchical markers that would denote his status,
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recording in his notebook his seating position compared to
that of other representatives including those from Nepal,
Kashmir, Bhutan, and Ladakh. Bell, in his losar notes, also
documented that it was the ranking Tibetan officials from
high to low who offered their khatak to the Dalai Lama
first. Only when all the Tibetans had made their presentation were the foreign representatives allowed to make
their khatak presentation, and unlike in Darjeeling, when
the Dalai Lama had offered and received the khatak from
Bell with his own hands, there would be no such material
contact between the two men now that the site had shifted
to Lhasa.40 Instead, in this context, Bell had been instructed to make a deep bow and present his khatak meant for
the Dalai Lama into the hands of the Chikhyap Khenpo (spyi
khyab mkhan po)—the highest monk official in the Lhasa
government. Bell and by extension the British were no
longer the dominant power here and they were in fact
not even classed as equals. Like the Dalai Lama had been
in 1910, they were beyond the borders of their powerbase
and as a religious force in the long-standing familial, commercial, and diplomatic ties that existed between Lhasa,
several Himalayan states, and the wider Tibetan Buddhist
communities of Asia, the British were of little consequence. Yet, Bell’s sense of being ‘Tibetanised’ meant that
he had shown a willingness to work within the parameters
of Tibetan khatak hierarchies and this apparently did not
go unnoticed by the Dalai Lama. After the ceremony, Bell
was told by one of his closest Tibetan confidants, Palhase
(pha lha’i sras) (c.1870-c.1936) that the Dalai Lama had
offered a gesture that Bell had not registered; he had held
out his upturned palms as he received the khatak from
the Chikhyap Khenpo. An honor, Bell learned, that was only
given to one other foreign dignitary—the Chinese amban.41
This from the British perspective must have been something of a dubious honor indeed.
Wrapping Up the Khatak
So ubiquitous is the khatak in trans-Himalayan culture
it is easy to presume one knows what it means. In these
geographical, cultural, and diplomatic borderlands we see
that meanings became fuzzy and difficult to translate. In
its negotiation, recorded in colonial files, gestures, and the
actual materiality of the khatak itself, it is possible to see
how these meanings were made, and how a scarf was used
to make and project both colonial and Tibetan knowledge
and prestige.
These were moments of acute anxiety for the British India
government, who tethered themselves and found imperial
comfort in a framework of precedents, developed for the
most part in the plains of India. When the British had to
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move away from these heartlands, a shakiness soon appeared in their decision-making processes and it is all too
clear that Tibetan things could divide colonial opinion. The
response to the khatak was anything but unanimous and
was instead filled with uncertainties in the metropoles,
with culture contact responses immediately challenged by
those who understood the workings of Himalayan networks and alliances. There was nothing monolithic about
colonial knowledge-making here; multiple forms of knowledge produced in different colonial spaces informed it. In
Lhasa, the British had finally seen how they too were understood as a useful, if peripheral government on the edge
of Tibet’s diplomatic and religious world. In this context,
a British official was not, and never had been, of sufficient
standing to place a khatak into the hands of Tibet’s leading
lamas when they resided in their seat of power.
Finally, more than a century ago, the British set a precedent that the international community still follows today.
Accordingly, the Dalai Lama’s visits to state leaders are
still judged to be private with his status always open to
question and interpretation – and, for the most part,
formulated in the light of Chinese sensibilities, actions, or
possible reactions. In this meeting in March 1910, we see
a diplomatic imagining of Tibet and the Dalai Lama that
even today continues both in turn to include and exclude
Tibetans from discussions with the world’s heads of state
and religious figureheads.
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of the thirteenth Dalai Lama’s biography, the fourth
Purchok, Tupten Jampa Tsültrim Tenzin (phur lcog thub
bstan byams pa tshul khrims bstan ’dzin) (dates unknown)
was not a historian, but a religious scholar and it seems
that critical pieces of archival material were not used or
collated when he compiled and then published the Dalai
Lama’s biography some seven years after his death in 1940.
Several years or periods have information that seem to
be little more than vague memories of events, while for
several years the entries simply state that the relevant

documents and diaries could not be located. All of these
factors combined with the chaos of exile ensured that
scant information is now available for critical moments of
Anglo-Tibetan contact that the Dalai Lama was party to.
35. The full record of this visit is as follows: “He traveled
to the place, currently known to the people as Calcutta,
where he met and exchanged greetings with Mulula (Lord
Minto), the British Regent. He visited factories and zoos
where animals are kept. He remained for seven days by
engaging in activities of great benefits”. (deng sang yul
skad la ka le ka tar grags pa der phyag phebs te dbyin ji’i
rgyal tshab mu lu la la mtshams zhu dang mjal ’phrad
mdzad/ ’phrul bzo dang/ spyan gzigs ri dwags sna tshogs
yod pa rnams la spyan ras kyis btsa’ ba dang/ rang gzhan la
phan pa’i don rlabs po che mdzad cing zhag bdun bzhugs/).
(phur lcog thub bstan byams pa tshul khrims bstan ’dzin,
2010: 150).
36. deng sang yul skad la ka le ka tar grags pa der phyag
phebs te dbyin ji’i rgyal tshab mu lu la la mtshams zhu
dang mjal ’phrad mdzad/
37. In many respects David Macdonald’s published works
are a rewriting of colonial history making. Macdonald,
critical to the knowledge produced on Tibet in the northeastern Himalaya in the early twentieth century, was
often written out of this process by the colonial officers he
worked with. While he received some recognition for his
scholarly knowledge many others did not credit him. See
my forthcoming article, Knowing Tibet in the Borderlands:
the Knowledge Making Networks of Himalayan Hill
Stations. I would suggest that by highlighting the type
of khatak he received during this exchange he was
highlighting the elevated position he perceived the Dalai
Lama to hold him in.
38. Bell would instruct Tibetans to refer to him as Lönchen
or Chief Minister (blon chen), the highest civil position in
Tibetan lay society. In British India however, the post of
Political Officer Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet was classed as a
‘second class resident’ in the British India hierarchy (Coen,
1971: 248).
39. The Dalai Lama had returned to Tibet in 1912 following
the collapse of the Qing empire and the removal of Chinese
troops from central Tibet. Back in Lhasa in February
1913, he issued what is regarded as a declaration of
independence (Shakabpa 1967: 246).
40. Only the Kalon Tripa or Prime Minister (bka’ blon khri
pa) was allowed to offer a khatak directly to the Dalai Lama
in this context.
41. “It was generally noticed that when I presented
my Khata [sic] to the Chikyab Kempo for the D.[alai]
L.[ama] the latter put his two palms forward towards me,

an honour which he shows to nobody but the Chinese
Amban.” Private Collection, Charles Bell, Diary Volume
VIII, pp.84-85.
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